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Youth Unemployment and 




Although the total youth unemployment rate in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries is less than in other high-income countries, the female youth unemploy-
ment rate is more than quadruple the male youth unemployment rate compared 
to equal rates in high-income countries. The gender bias in youth unemployment 
is attributable to the generous social contract GCC nationals enjoy as well as the 
largely conservative GCC culture that perceives a more important role of women in 
the household than in the job market. The generous social contract is also a key fac-
tor in the duality of the GCC labor markets with one segment for national labor and 
the other for foreign labor. Foreign labor constitutes most of the labor force, and the 
link between pay and productivity is strong in the foreign labor segment indicating 
labor market efficiency. This chapter investigates whether the presence of strong 
pay-productivity links in both labor market segments reduces the national youth 
unemployment rates in the GCC countries. Empirical evidence shows that linking 
pay to productivity robustly reduces the total and female youth unemployment 
rates. The influence is strongest on the female youth unemployment rate, however. 
Productivity-pay helps reduce youth unemployment and the associated gender bias.
Keywords: youth unemployment, female youth unemployment rate,  
male youth unemployment, labor markets, productivity-pay, GCC
1. Introduction
The oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are high-income coun-
tries. They include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). Over the past two decades (2000–2020), Qatar, UAE, and 
Bahrain had the highest population growth rates of 8.2 percent, 5.9 percent, and 4.8 
percent, respectively, followed by Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia at rates of 4.1 
percent, 3.8 percent, and 2.6 percent.1 The corresponding population growth rates 
for the Arab world, high income countries, and the world total are 2.2 percent, 0.6 
percent, and 1.2 percent, respectively.
Despite the high population growth rates of the GCC countries, youth unem-
ployment rates were lower than the rates in other high-income countries. High 
youth unemployment can constrain long-term growth and reduce economic, social, 
1 Figures are based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
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and political stability [1].2 As Table 1 shows, the total youth unemployment rate in 
2007–2017 averaged 28.5 percent, 12.5 percent, and 11.9 percent in Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, and Kuwait, respectively.3 In comparison, the rate amounted to 6.9 percent, 
5.3 percent, and 1 percent in the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, respectively.4
Compared to other high-income countries, the total youth unemployment rate 
in the GCC countries is lower. In 2007–2017, the total youth unemployment rate 
amounted on average to 11 percent in the GCC countries compared to 18 percent in 
a sample of 44 high-income countries.5 The difference is even larger for the male 
youth rate: The male youth unemployment rate is 8.5 percent in the GCC countries 
compared to 18.1 percent in the other high-income countries. The GCC countries 
therefore fared well relative to other high-income countries with respect to the total 
and male youth unemployment rates.
Female youth unemployment is a serious issue in the GCC countries, however.6 
The female youth unemployment rate is 20.6 percent compared to 8.5 percent for 
the male youth unemployment rate, resulting in a ratio of female-to-male youth 
unemployment rate of 4.5.7,8 In the sample of 44 other high-income countries, the 
male and female youth unemployment rates are almost equal (18.1 percent).
In addition, the GCC countries experience female youth unemployment rate 
heterogeneity. The female youth unemployment rate is higher in Saudi Arabia (53 
percent), Oman (24.6 percent) and Kuwait (16.7 percent) compared to Bahrain 
(12.8 percent), UAE (11.2 percent), and Qatar (5.5 percent). This is perhaps not 
unusual given the pattern of the total youth unemployment rate in the two groups 
of countries.
However, the ratio of female-to-male youth unemployment rate is highly 
pronounced in Qatar and Bahrain. Despite enjoying low total youth unemployment 
rate, Qatar and Bahrain have the highest female-to-male youth unemployment rate 
2 Youth unemployment refers to the labor force ages 15–24 without work but is available for and seeking 
employment. Youth unemployment rate measures the extent of youth unemployment. The youth unem-
ployment rate is measured as the number of youth unemployed relative to the total labor force between 
ages 15–24.
3 This rate includes both male and female youth unemployment.
4 The GCC countries can be therefore perceived as two heterogenous groups with respect to the total 
youth unemployment rate.
5 The sample of high-income countries include Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, US, and Uruguay.
6 Another useful metric of an active (female) labor force is the (female) labor force participation rate. 
This metric accounts for ages 15 and above and is not restricted to (female) youth. It is calculated as 
the sum of all (female) workers who are employed or actively seeking employment divided by the total 
noninstitutionalized, civilian (female) working-age population.
7 Based on WDI data, the period average female labor force participation rate is 39.9 percent, which is 
less than half the male labor force participation rate (86.9 percent). The period average female labor force 
participation rate is lowest in Saudi Arabia (20 percent), Oman (28.4 percent), and Bahrain (43.1 per-
cent). See the Appendix for information on the individual GCC countries labor force participation rate 
for both genders. In the other high-income countries, the period average female labor force participation 
rate amounts to 53.8 percent. The lowest rates are in Malta (38 percent) and Italy (39 percent).
8 International Labor Organization data suggests regional female labor participation rate is lower in ear-
lier years [2]. Female labor participation rate for Arab states was 12.8 percent in 2000 and dropped to 9.5 
percent in 2011. The Arab states include Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
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ratio of nearly 14 and 5, respectively. The average female youth unemployment rate 
is nearly 14-fold the male youth unemployment rate in the case of Qatar and five-
fold in the case of Bahrain.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain youth unemployment in the GCC coun-
tries. I start by discussing the reasons for the gender bias in female youth unem-
ployment (Section 2). The presence of generous existing social contract for GCC 
nationals as well as cultural factors are offered as explanations for the gender bias. 
The social contract is key to understanding the dual nature of GCC labor markets. 
To be able to reduce the youth unemployment rate, it is important to understand the 
degree of labor market efficiency. I discuss GCC labor markets efficiency and posit 
that it reflects more the foreign labor segment (Section 3). I conjecture that having 
a strong pay-productivity link in both the national and foreign labor segments can 
reduce the female and consequently the total youth unemployment rate (Section 4). 
This conjecture is based on a graphical analysis of the relationship between youth 
unemployment and the pay-productivity link in 124 non-GCC countries as well as 
in the six GCC countries. To explain youth unemployment empirically, I specify 
and estimate an empirical model (Section 5). The empirical results show that 
linking pay to productivity reduces the female and total youth unemployment rates 
(Section 6). I conclude with a policy recommendation (Section 7).
2. Social contract and labor market segmentation
The generous implicit social contract the GCC states have extended to its nation-
als is believed to have shaped their expectations and decisions to work. The social 
contract includes highly paid and protected government jobs as well unemployment 
benefits [3–5]. It also includes free education, health care, and child support. At 
retirement, generous public pensions are provided.
The highly paid government jobs have created high expectations about jobs in 
the private sector including high reservation wages. Thus, national youth on the 
labor supply side may offer their labor services at high wage rates. On the labor 
demand side, at high wage rates the demand for national youth labor services is 
normally low especially if unaccompanied by high productivity. The interaction of 
the supply and demand for labor leaves a surplus of national youth unemployed. 
The high reservation wages and unemployment benefits may reduce job search and 
increase the duration of unemployment.
Total (%) Male (%) Female (%) Female-to-Male Ratio
Bahrain 5.3 2.6 12.8 4.9
Kuwait 11.9 9.9 16.7 1.7
Oman 12.5 10.2 24.6 2.4
Qatar 1.0 0.4 5.5 13.6
Saudi Arabia 28.5 21.7 53.0 2.5
UAE 6.9 5.9 11.2 1.9
Total 11.0 8.5 20.6 4.5
Memo item
Other high-income countries 18.01 18.06 18.09 1.02
Table 1. 
Youth unemployment rates in the GCC countries (2007–2017; period average).
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With oil revenues financing the generous (implicit) social contract and eco-
nomic activities in the GCC economies, the hiring of foreign labor was inevitable 
given the economic growth following oil exploration and production, and the lim-
ited indigenous population, labor force or human capital.9 The stipulated benefits in 
foreign labor (explicit) contracts do not on average match those of GCC nationals. 
Accordingly, the GCC labor markets are segmented de facto.
In addition to the social contract and the resulting labor market segmentation, 
and the relatively less costly foreign labor, cultural factors weigh in towards more 
female youth unemployment. The GCC culture is largely conservative as suggested 
by gender segregation at public schools and universities. Many females prefer to 
remain at the household as opposed to working or remaining on the job market.10 It 
should be noted however that the literacy rate gender parity index for youth shows 
that both genders are at par.11
3. Labor market efficiency: Pay and productivity
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) assesses 
labor market flexibility and efficiency. The assessments are based on executive 
opinion survey. Businesses included in the survey represent the sectors they operate 
in. These comprise agriculture, manufacturing industry, non-manufacturing indus-
try, and services. The number of businesses surveyed depends on the contribution 
of the sector to GDP.12 Surveyed businesses are in principle not necessarily large 
corporations. They may be small or medium in size.
Linking pay to productivity, performance-based pay, or performance-pay for 
short, is a labor market efficiency indicator. Given the segmented nature of the 
GCC labor markets and the significant presence of foreign workers in the GCC 
countries, the indicator tends to reflect the strength of the relationship between 
productivity and pay in the foreign labor segment.13 Although the pay-productivity 
link is perceived as strong relative to the other high-income countries, labor is non-
unionized and collective bargaining is absent. This may partially explain the link 
strength.14
Table 2 presents the 2007–2017 period average of the linking pay to productiv-
ity indicator for each of the GCC countries. A score of 1 indicates that the two are 
completely unrelated, while a score of 7 indicates they are strongly related. The table 
shows that Qatar and the UAE have the highest average scores, while Kuwait has the 
lowest. It also shows that the GCC countries, as a group, have a higher average than 
other high-income countries.
9 The average annual growth rates for Bahrain is 3.77 percent (1981–2020), Kuwait 4.57 percent 
(1993–2019), Oman 8.38 percent (1966–2019), Qatar 8.43 percent (2001–2020), Saudi Arabia 4.86 
percent (1969–2020), and UAE 4.86 percent (1976–2019). The rates are mathematical averages of annual 
growth rates obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) over the specified 
periods.
10 If they decide accordingly not to search for jobs, they should not be considered as part of the labor 
force. In cases of divorce, females may start searching for jobs, however.
11 This is based on the WDI 2017 literacy rate gender parity index for youth for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and the 2015 index for the UAE.
12 Non-manufacturing industry includes mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply, and 
construction.
13 There is no collective bargaining in the GCC labor markets though.
14 The strength of the link may depend on business professional management in case of large businesses.
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4.  The relationship between labor market efficiency and youth 
unemployment
Several IMF working papers find that labor market flexibility reduces unem-
ployment [6–8]. Labor market flexibility, in particular hiring and firing policies 
and hiring costs, was found to reduce over unemployment, youth unemployment 
and long-term unemployment [6]. It was also found to reduce unemployment in 
Algeria, a resource-rich, labor-abundant North African country [7]. Flexible labor 
markets were also found to help fending off financial crises [8].
Does labor market efficiency, measured by the pay-productivity link, influence 
the youth unemployment rate? And what is the nature of the relationship? To 
answer these two questions, I undertake in this chapter a graphical analysis of this 










Other high-income countries 4.27
Table 2. 
The pay-productivity link (2007–2017; period average).
Figure 1. 
Total youth unemployment rate and performance-pay: Large country sample evidence.
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countries as well as in the six high-income GCC countries. Figure 1 suggests the 
presence of a negative relationship between the total youth unemployment rate and 
the pay-productivity link in a large sample of non-GCC countries.15 This relation-
ship still holds if I instead examine the influence of lagged pay-productivity link on 
the total youth unemployment rate.
Figures 2–4, which are based on 2007–2017 period averages, also suggest the 
presence of a negative relationship in GCC countries for the total, male, and female 
youth unemployment rates.16
15 Graphical analysis also shows the youth unemployment rate negatively influences the pay-productivity 
link. Figure is available from the author.
16 The figures are based on 2007–2017 period averages.
Figure 2. 
Total youth unemployment rate and performance-pay in GCC countries.
Figure 3. 
Male youth unemployment rate and performance-pay in GCC countries.
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Labor economics theory explains this relationship in terms of the substitution 
effect of higher wages on labor supply. Higher wages associated with more produc-
tivity encourage workers to increase their work hours. Alternatively, higher wages 
encourage workers to reduce their leisure hours in response. At the macro level, 
when youth observe that work effort and productivity are rewarded, they search for 
jobs and take employment. This in turn reduces the youth unemployment rate.
Therefore, I conjecture that having a strong pay-productivity link in both the 
national and foreign labor segments can reduce the female and consequently the 
total youth unemployment rate. In explaining the different youth unemployment 
rates – total, male, and female, I will assume in the next section that the strength of 
pay-productivity link is equal in both labor market segments.
5.  Explaining youth unemployment in the GCC countries - the empirical 
model
The negative relationship between the different youth unemployment rates and 
productivity-pay observed in the above graphs is investigated empirically. Building 
on [9] who examines the relationship between labor market flexibility and youth 
unemployment, the empirical model includes the pay-productivity link as an 
explanatory variable.17 In this chapter, I explain the different youth unemployment 
rates (total, male, or female). The empirical model is now expressed as:
 
0 1 2 3 4it it it it it it
UR PP GROWTH GFINANCE URBANβ β β β β ε= + + + + +  
where UR is youth unemployment rate. PP is the pay-productivity link 
indicator (log). GROWTH is economic growth, a proxy for the expansion in 
17 In [6], control variables include an output gap measure to control for business cycle fluctuations, the 
size of government, the degree of trade openness, the rate of urbanization, population density, a crisis 
dummy, and the lagged level of unemployment rate(s).
Figure 4. 
Female youth unemployment rate and performance-pay in GCC countries.
Macroeconomics
8
job opportunities. It is measured by the annual GDP per capita growth rate. 
GFINANCE is government fiscal expenditures, which account for the major 
employment role the GCC governments play in hiring nationals. GFINANCE is 
measured by the general government final consumption expenditures (as a percent-
age of GDP). URBAN is the degree of urbanization in the economy. It accounts for 
the geographic concentration of business in urban areas and is measured by the 
percentage of urban to total population. ε is the error term. The subscripts i and t 
are country and time indexes.
Data on PP are obtained from GCI. Data on the other variables are obtained 
from WDI. The data covers the period 2007–2017.
Panel data models are used in estimation. I account for both the GCC coun-
try- and time-specific effects. Country-specific effects may include factors such 
as culture and traditions, which do not change by time at least in the short and 
medium terms. Time-specific effects are related to global factors, such as oil prices 
or foreign direct investment, which are not country-specific and may impact the 
GCC countries at specific years.
6. Empirical results
Table 3 provides the 2007–2017 period average for the model variables. The table 
shows four interesting observations. First, Qatar and the UAE have the strongest 
pay-productivity links, as indicated by their scores. Second, Saudi Arabia and 
Oman have the highest level of fiscal expenditures relative to GDP. Yet they have 
the highest youth unemployment rates. Third, more than three quarters of the GCC 
population live in urban areas. Finally, the GDP per capita growth rates are negative 
for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and UAE.
The correlation between the different variables reveals interesting initial 
relationships, as Table 4 shows. PP is negatively and statistically correlated with 
the total and male youth unemployment rates.18 Government expenditures, 
GFINANCE, are positively correlated with all youth unemployment rates, while the 
degree of urbanization, URBAN, is negatively correlated with them all. The correla-
tion between the GDP per capita growth rate, GROWTH, and the different youth 
unemployment rates is very low.
18 Pairwise correlated at the 5 percent statistical significance level.
Country UR PP GROWTH GFINANCE URBAN
Total Male Female
Bahrain 5.1 2.5 12.5 4.5 0.3 14.3 88.7
Kuwait 11.2 10.0 13.7 3.9 −3.3 16.8 100.0
Oman 12.4 10.4 22.2 4.3 −0.8 20.4 76.8
Qatar 1.2 0.5 6.2 5.1 −0.1 14.0 98.5
Saudi Arabia 29.2 22.3 53.8 4.6 1.2 22.1 82.3
UAE 7.0 6.0 11.2 5.0 −2.8 9.8 84.4
Total 11.0 8.6 19.9 4.6 −0.9 16.2 88.5
Table 3. 
Empirical model variables (2007–2017; period averages).
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6.1 Fixed effects model estimates
Empirical results are presented in Table 5. As mentioned above, the estimation 
methodology accounts for both country and time effects. Thus, the table provides 
estimates by country and year.
PP UR-Total UR-Male UR-Female GROWTH GFINANCE URBAN
UR-Total −0.275 1 0.986 0.965 0.090 0.655 −0.454
UR-Male −0.313 0.986 1 0.915 0.053 0.617 −0.445
UR-Female −0.180 0.965 0.915 1 0.136 0.684 −0.481
GROWTH 0.147 0.090 0.053 0.136 1 0.105 −0.101
GFINANCE −0.396 0.655 0.617 0.684 0.105 1 −0.241
URBAN −0.055 −0.454 −0.445 −0.481 −0.101 −0.241 1




PP −13.235a −12.796a −21.837a
(2.030) (2.856) (7.391)
GROWTH −0.068b −0.035 −0.215b
(0.026) (0.027) (0.087)
GFINANCE 0.044 −0.115 0.299
(0.098) (0.132) (0.283)
URBAN −0.487a −0.507a 0.683
(0.138) (0.147) (0.439)
Kuwait 9.507a 11.709a −10.992b
(1.418) (1.367) (4.449)
Oman 0.469 1.844 14.534b
(2.095) (2.299) (6.719)
Qatar 2.420 4.384b −10.414b
(1.556) (1.696) (5.062)
Saudi Arabia 20.998a 17.753a 44.035a
(1.455) (1.816) (4.476)
UAE 1.113b 1.961a 4.513a
(0.491) (0.619) (1.318)
Year−2007 −2.203a -2.004c −1.744
(0.669) (1.054) (2.452)
Year-2008 −1.617b −1.873 −0.161
(0.786) (1.127) (2.398)
Year-2009 −1.631b −1.333c −0.825
(0.661) (0.765) (1.940)
Year-2010 −1.195c −1.079 −0.096
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The results confirm the negative relationship between productivity-pay and 
youth unemployment observed in Figures 2, 3 and 4. In the three columns, the PP 
coefficients are negative suggesting a negative influence of the productivity-pay 
link on the three youth unemployment rates. However, the absolute coefficient 
value is biggest for the female youth unemployment rate. The coefficient indicates 
that a one percent improvement in the strength of the pay-productivity link reduces 
the total, male, and female youth unemployment rates by 0.13 percentage point, 
0.12 percentage point, and about 0.22 percentage point, respectively. These coef-
ficients suggest therefore that the influence on the female youth unemployment rate 
is almost double the influence on the male youth unemployment rate. The pay-
productivity link plays a relatively more significant role in reducing female youth 
unemployment in the GCC countries.
GROWTH also has a negative influence, as we would normally expect. It is 
statistically significant in the total and female youth unemployment rate models. 
Interestingly, both PP and GROWTH have equal coefficients: A one percentage 
point increase in GDP per capita growth rate reduces the female youth unemploy-
ment rate by 0.22 percentage point. In contrast to [1], GFINANCE does not have a 
statistically significant influence on the different unemployment rates. The degree 
of urbanization, URBAN, reduces the total and male youth unemployment rates but 
not the female youth unemployment rate.
The coefficients of the country dummies – the country-specific effects - suggest 
that the country effects do not reduce total or male youth unemployment. This is 
obvious in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. Only in Kuwait and Qatar, the 
country-specific effects reduce the female youth unemployment rate.
The coefficients of the time dummies are negative and statistically significant 
in the total youth unemployment rate model. The time dummies are statistically 
significant at least at the 5 percent level in 2007–2009 and 2012. The increase in the 
world oil prices in 2006–2016, as Figure 5 shows, may provide an explanation for 
this outcome. The oil price increase possibly feeds through GDP growth rate reduc-
ing the total youth unemployment rate.
Total Male Female
(0.611) (0.733) (2.256)
Year-2011 −1.194c −1.369 0.356
(0.682) (0.874) (1.813)
Year-2012 −1.207b −1.790b 1.014
(0.552) (0.763) (1.703)
Year-2013 −0.902c −1.207c 0.032
(0.502) (0.667) (1.540)
Year-2014 −0.223 −0.372 0.087
(0.428) (0.574) (1.563)
Constant 68.707a 69.584a −19.331
(13.730) (14.933) (44.733)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.996 0.987 0.987
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Table 5. 
Fixed effects model estimates (LSDV estimation).
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6.2 Feasible generalized least squares estimates
Although the GCC countries seem alike, they may be different from each other 
in how the youth unemployment rate is explained by the empirical model. Thus, 
I test for panel-level heteroscedasticity. I also test for autocorrelation in the error 
term. If either or both empirical issues are present, I plan to adopt a feasible gener-
alized least squares (FGLS) estimation methodology.
Since the likelihood ratio χ2 test rejects the null hypothesis of panel-level 
homoscedasticity at the one percent level for the three youth unemployment 
rates, as Table 6 shows, I adopt FGLS accounting for panel heteroskedasticity. 
The Wooldridge F test for autocorrelation fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
panel-level autocorrelation in the case of total youth unemployment rate. However, 
the test rejects the null hypothesis at the five percent level in the case of male and 
female youth unemployment rates. I account for serial correlation in FGLS estima-
tion of these two youth unemployment rates.
FGLS estimation results are presented in Table 7. Results confirm the negative 
influence that linking pay to productivity has on the total and female youth unem-
ployment rates but not on the male youth unemployment rate. An improvement in 
the pay-productivity link strength by one percent reduces the total and female youth 
unemployment rate by 0.23 percentage point and 0.21 percentage point, respectively.
Figure 5. 
World crude (Brent) oil prices (1987–2020; $/barrel).




Notes: The null hypothesis for the heteroscedasticity test is panel-level homoscedasticity. The null hypothesis for the 
autocorrelation test is the absence of (across) panel autocorrelation. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6. 
Panel heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests.
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In contrast to the results of Table 5, empirical evidence shows that government 
expenditures increase the youth unemployment rates. A one percentage point 
increase in the share of government consumption expenditures in GDP increases 
the total and female youth unemployment rate by 0.44 percentage point and 0.4 
percentage point, respectively. This result is in line with [1], who finds that an 
increase in government consumption expenditures (percentage of GDP) by one 
percentage point increases the total youth unemployment rate.
It might be the case that through consumption expenditures that the GCC 
governments put incomes in the hands of households, which discourage youth from 
searching for and taking jobs. From labor economics theory perspective, this is the 
negative (positive) income effect on work (leisure) hours. An increase in incomes 
discourage youth from increasing their labor supply. Alternatively, an increase in 
incomes encourage youth to take more leisure hours.
In contrast to the positive influence of government finance and like the result of 
Table 5 for total youth unemployment, the degree of urbanization reduces the total 
youth unemployment rate. It also reduces the female youth unemployment rate. In 
addition, the GDP per capita growth rate reduces only the female youth unemploy-
ment rate but only marginally statistically.
7. Conclusion and policy recommendation
The empirical analysis of the two estimation methodologies supports the 
beneficial influence of linking pay to productivity on the total and female youth 
unemployment rates. Labor market efficiency can help reduce youth unemploy-
ment. This suggests that having an equal link strength in both labor market 
segments rewards the national youth, especially females.
The adoption of policies that increase labor market flexibility and efficiency 
to reduce (youth) unemployment is not unusual. Spain, for example, in 2010 and 
(1) (2) (3)
Total Male Female
PP −22.693a −4.018 −20.603a
(6.102) (2.850) (4.633)
GROWTH −0.123 −0.019 −0.108c
(0.098) (0.032) (0.058)
GFINANCE 0.437a 0.080 0.399a
(0.157) (0.051) (0.098)
URBAN −0.318a −0.028 −0.326a
(0.082) (0.079) (0.095)
Constant 64.853a 15.790 67.470a
(14.247) (9.790) (13.569)
Observations 54 54 54
Number of countries 6 6 6
Wald test 42.76a 4.72 47.32a
Panel heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes
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2012 relaxed contract termination, reduced severance pay, notice period, and 
business social security contributions [1, 10].19 The strength of collective bargain-
ing was reduced, and enterprise-level agreement increased [10]. Firms have been 
able to withdraw from collective bargaining agreements one year from the agree-
ment expiry date. Despite increasing labor market flexibility, youth unemploy-
ment remained high due to the downward rigidity of nominal wages, among other 
reasons [1]. The implicit GCC social contracts result in downward nominal wage 
rigidity.
The chapter recommends the adoption of labor efficiency policies and practices. 
Paying labor its economic value establishes efficiency in both labor market seg-
ments and encourage national youth to search for and take jobs not just in the gov-
ernment and state-owned enterprises – the traditional employer of nationals, but 
also in the private sector. Estimation results suggest that the magnitude of influence 
on female youth unemployment is relatively strong. GCC policy makers should be 
well-versed about the importance of the pay-productivity link and its implications 
for human resource management at the organization level. The obtained results 
suggest that national female youth are motivated by pay rewards.
Besides, efficiency helps clear the negative perceptions about labor market 
segmentation and the ensuing pay unfairness, and the gender bias. Labor efficiency 
helps in the efficient use of available domestic labor resources and in less reliance 
on foreign labor. By encouraging nationals of both genders to seek opportunities 
in the private sector, the adoption of labor efficiency policies and practices can 
help nationals of both genders develop a gamut of work-related skills including 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship can help in job creation and reducing youth 
unemployment.
Finally, although this chapter makes the case of linking pay to productivity to 
reduce the youth unemployment challenge, I should point out though there is no one-
solution-fit-all if the goal of reduction of the youth unemployment rates is regarded 
as merely political. GCC policymakers may consider alternative solutions to youth 
unemployment in changing economic, political, social environment. The remain-
ing reality, however, is that each adopted solution has pros and cons that should be 
considered.
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